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Since the first settlers arrived in this country, the United States has
always been a melting pot of nationalities. The constant influx of aliens
led the federal government to begin regulating who could enter the coun-
try, over a century ago. One resulting piece of legislation was the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act' (INA), which sets forth twenty-two grounds
that can bar an alien from entering the United States.2 In June, 1993,
1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988).
2. Id. § 1182(a) (Supp. 1993). The provision states that the following classes of aliens
are excludable: 1) any alien who has a communicable disease of public health significance;
2) any alien who has, or had, a physical or mental disorder that may pose, or has posed, a
threat to the welfare of the alien or others; 3) any alien who is a drug abuser or addict; 4)
any alien convicted of, or who has committed, a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime
in violation of a law involving a controlled substance; 5) any alien convicted of two or more
offenses; 6) any alien who is a drug trafficker or who has assisted, abetted or conspired with
others to traffic drugs; 7) any alien who comes to the United States to engage in prostitu-
tion or other unlawful commercialized vice, who has engaged in prostitution, or who in-
tends to import prostitutes; 8) any alien who has committed a serious criminal offense in
the United States and who has asserted immunity from prosecution in the United States; 9)
any alien who comes to the United States to engage in unlawful activity related to espio-
nage or sabotage, export sensitive goods, commit espionage, or to overthrow the Govern-
ment of the United States; 10) any alien who has engaged in, or who is likely to engage in,
a terrorist activity; 11) any alien whose entry or proposed activities in the United States
would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences; 12) any immigrant
who is or has been a member of or affiliated with the Communist or other totalitarian
party; 13) any alien who was associated with the Nazi government of Germany, or govern-
ments occupied, established by, or allied with the Nazi government, between March 23,
1933, and May 8, 1945; 14) any alien who has engaged in actions amounting to genocide;
15) any alien who is likely to become a public charge; 16) any alien who seeks to enter the
United States to perform skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Attorney General certifies
that the alien's employment will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of
similar U.S. workers; 17) any alien who is a graduate of a foreign medical school and comes
to the United States to practice medicine, who has not passed the National Board of Medi-
cal Examiners Examination; 18) any alien who was previously deported who seeks admis-
sion within one year; 19) any alien who was previously deported for a crime or as an alien
enemy who seeks admission within five years (or within 20 years for an alien convicted of
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Congress amended the INA to include infection with the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus (HIV) as a legitimate reason to bar an alien's entry
into the country.' Congress's ability to enact exclusionary laws is based
on its power to protect and preserve the sovereignty of the United
States. 4 The judiciary has continuously held that Congress's exclusionary
powers are inherently broad.5 Precedent, therefore, establishes that the
HIV-exclusion law is valid. The law, however, was recently used to justify
the indefinite detention of approximately 200 HIV-infected Haitian refu-
gees at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (hereinafter
Guantanamo).6 This application of the HIV-exclusion law clearly vio-
lated the Haitians' liberty interests in not being indefinitely detained.7
Despite the fact that all of the HIV-infected Haitian refugees detained
at Guantanamo qualified for political asylum within the United States,
they were barred from entering the United States by the HIV-exclusion
law because of their HIV infection.8 The law created a serious dilemma
an aggravated felony); 20) any alien who by fraud willfully misrepresented a material fact
in order to procure a visa or other documentation; 21) any alien who is a stowaway; and
22) any alien who knowingly encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other
alien to illegally enter, or attempt to enter, the United States. Id. § 1182(a)(1)-(6).
3. See The National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
43 § 2007, 107 Stat. 210 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1993)).
The provision states:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following describes classes of
excludable aliens ineligible to receive visas and who shall be excluded from ad-
mission to the United States'
(1) Health-related grounds
(A) In general, any alien
(i) who is determined (in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services) to have a communicable disease of
public health significance, which shall include infection with the etiologic agent
for acquired immune deficiency syndrome...
Id. The regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services define
"communicable diseases of public health significance" as: Chancroid, Gonorrhea, Granu-
loma inguinale, Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection, infectious Leprosy, Lympho-
granuloma venereum, infectious Syphilis, and active Tuberculosis. 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)
(1993).
4. See infra part I.A. for a discussion of Congress's plenary powers over immigration.
5. Id.
6. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
7. Id. at 1045. Because no vaccine or cure for HIV infection appears imminent, and
infection with the virus can lead to the development of AIDS and consequently death,
Congress had a valid public protection rationale for making HIV-infection a grounds for
exclusion. However, the validity of the law does not justify its application to indefinitely
detain the HIV-infected Haitian refugees being held at Guantanamo.
8. House Votes to Ban HIV-Infected Immigrants, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 12,
1993. at 5.
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for these Haitian refugees. Had they simply been aliens with HIV, rather
than refugees with HIV, the Haitians would have been returned to Haiti
after being denied entry into the United States. As political refugees,
however, the HIV-infected Haitians could not return to Haiti for fear of
persecution.9 Because they could not be returned to Haiti, nor, as HIV-
infected aliens, could they enter the United States,1" the HIV-infected
Haitians remained indefinitely detained against their will at Guantanamo.
In Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale," the HIV-infected Haitians
challenged the government's right to indefinitely detain them. 12 The
plaintiffs were not challenging the validity of the HIV-exclusion law,
rather, the government's reliance on the law to justify forced and indefi-
nite detention. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York held that U.S. immigration law did not permit the indefinite
detention of aliens. 3 This decision, therefore, enabled the HIV-infected
Haitian refugees to circumvent the HIV-exclusion law and gain entry into
9., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988). An alien qualifies as a ",refugee" if he .s outside
the country of his nationality and is unwilling or unable to return to his country because of
a well-founded fear of persecution. Id.
10. See id. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1993).
11. 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
12. Id. at 1045.
13. Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1988 & Supp. 1992). The INA provides for the tempo-
rary detention of an alien for a duration necessary to determine whether the alien is ex-
cludable and subject to deportation. Id. However, if immediate deportation is not
practical or proper because the alien's country of origin will not accept him, the matter is
left to the discretion of the Attorney General. Id. § 1227(a)(1) (1988).
Some courts have held that this provision of the INA gives the executive branch the
authority to detain excludable aliens indefinitely. In Tartabull v. Thornburgh, 755 F. Supp.
145 (E.D. La. 1990), plaintiffs were Cubans who had come to the United States during the
1980 Mariel boatlift. Id. at 146. They had been detained since 1980 and sought habeas
corpus relief claiming that the INA did not authorize the Attorney General to detain them
indefinitely. Id. Rejecting this assertion, the court held that the Attorney General did
have such power in a case where the aliens could not be returned to their country of origin.
I& at 147.
In contrast, other courts have held that the indefinite detention of aliens is unconstitu-
tional. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that
the Attorney General lacked the authority to detain excludable aliens beyond a reasonable
period of time necessary to procure their return to their country of origin). Similarly, in In
re Brooks, 5 F.2d 238 (D. Mass. 1925), the court ordered the release of a Russian alien
from incarceration at Deer Island in Boston Harbor, where he had been detained for nine
weeks pending deportation, because he could not be returned to his country of origin due
to a lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and Russia. Id. at 239-40. The
Brooks court held:
[t]here is no power ... in any other tribunal in this country to hold indefinitely
any ... alien in imprisonment, except as punishment for crime. Slavery was abol-
ished by the Thirteenth Amendment. It is elementary that deportation or exclu-
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the United States. 14
This Note discusses the HIV-exclusion law and its effects on the Guan-
tanamo Haitians. Part I examines the history of United States immigra-
tion laws and investigates the doctrinal sources that provide Congress
with the power to exclude aliens for health-related reasons. Part II fo-
cuses on the plight of the refugees in Haitian Centers Council, and how
they were able to circumvent the HIV-exclusion law and gain entry into
the United States. Finally, Part III discusses the effect of Haitian Centers
Council on other HIV-infected aliens seeking to enter the United States.
This Note concludes that the decision in Haitian Centers Council was a
legally and morally correct decision. The HIV-exclusion law may be a
valid law, but it should not be distorted to justify forced and indefinite
detention of aliens. The law exists to protect the sovereignty and health
of the nation, which are important governmental functions. All other
concerns, however, should not be set aside in furtherance of this protec-
tion. Certainly, the indefinite detention of individuals who have commit-
ted no crime should not be justified under the veil of the HIV-exclusion
law.
I. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAWS
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine
In 1892, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is an accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent
in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners ... or to admit them only... upon such conditions as it may
see fit to prescribe."' 5 Thus, immigration into the United States is a privi-
sion proceedings are not punishment for crime .... He is entitled to be deported,
or to have his freedom.
Id. at 239 (citations omitted).
14. Church Groups to Resettle Guantanamo Haitians, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 11,
1993, at 5.
15. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). See also Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (upholding constitutionality of statute authorizing deportation
of resident aliens based on membership in the Communist Party, even if membership ter-
minated before enactment of the statute); United States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537, 539 (1950) (excluding alien, who had worked as civilian employee for the U.S.
armed forces and who was married to a U.S. citizen, for reasons that were confidential but
which "would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States"); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that permit-
ted the deportation of any resident Chinese laborer who failed to apply to the Internal
Revenue Service for a certificate of residence); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The
Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (affirming that indefinite detention of a resi-
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lege, not a right.16 An alien may be granted this privilege only if he meets
the requirements prescribed by the sovereign United States
government.17
Because the purpose of immigration legislation is the protection of
state sovereignty, Congress's power to regulate immigration is inherently
broad. 8 This grant of broad power is known as the plenary power doc-
trine. 9 The doctrine stands for the proposition that Congress's power
over immigration is as comprehensive as necessary to ensure the preser-
vation of the nation.20 Congress can therefore exclude foreigners when-
ever the public interest demands.
21
For example, the discovery of gold in 1848 prompted a mass immigra-
tion of laborers from China.22 In response, Congress promulgated an
Act 23 prohibiting Chinese laborers from entering the United States in or-
der to protect the rights of domestic laborers.24 When the number of
Chinese immigrants increased to a level where the number of Chinese
laborers residing in the United States became a competitive threat, Con-
gress denied their continued immigration. 25 Congress's actions in this in-
dent alien of 12 years, who was seeking to re-enter the United States after a visit to China,
was not an unlawful restraint of the alien's liberty).
16. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542 (pointing out that "an alien who seeks admission to this
country may not do so under any claim of right").
17. Id.
18. Developments in the Law - Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1286, 1312 (1983). Plenary power encompasses the authority to regulate substan-
tive and procedural immigration matters. The government determines which aliens can
enter and what procedures will be used to permit their entry. Id.
19. Id. For almost a century the Supreme Court has asserted that the legislative and
executive branches possess plenary power over the exclusion of aliens. See, e.g., Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212
(1953); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1922); Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660.
20. Although no provision of the Constitution expressly endows Congress with the
power to exclude aliens, it has always been considered necessary to protect the country
from foreign dangers immune from constitutional limitations. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Ekiu, 142 U.S. 651; The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 (1889).
21. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609 (upholding as inherent in the right
of self-preservation the power to exc lude certain classes of persons whose presence is
deemed injurious to the country).
22. Id. at 594.
23. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 20, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (amended July 5, 1884).
24. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 595.
25. Id. In this case, the plaintiff was a Chinese laborer who had previously worked in
the United States for 12 years, and, who before returning to China, had procured a certifi-
cate entitling him re-entry. Id. at 582. Due to the implementation of this law during his
trip to China, the plaintiffs certificate of return was annulled and he was prohibited from
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stance evidenced the application of the plenary power doctrine to protect
the jobs of U.S. laborers.
B. Judicial Deference
For many years, the Supreme Court deferred to Congress's plenary
power in the area of immigration policy.2 6 The Court stated that, "[i]f
[Congress] considers the presence of foreigners ... to be dangerous to
[the nation's] peace and security,... [then] its determination is conclusive
upon the judiciary."2 7 The Court has also noted that the presence of
aliens can be dangerous during times of peace as well as during times of
war,28 thus necessitating deference in both situations. The Court's defer-
ence to Congress was epitomized when it held that "[w]hatever the proce-
dure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned. 2 9
Judicial deference permitted Congress to use its plenary power in
whatever manner it saw fit.30 For example, in Shaughnessy v. Mezei,31 an
alien, who had resided in the United States for twenty-five years, had
travelled to Hungary for nineteen months and was denied re-entry into
the United States.32 Without a hearing, the alien was ordered perma-
nently excluded based on confidential information suggesting the alien's
return would be prejudicial to the public interest for security reasons.33
The Court upheld the constitutionality of this governmental action with-
re-entering. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act despite its adverse
effect on the alien. The Court reasoned that the Government's right of self-preservation
was so important that it "[could] not be granted away or restrained on the behalf of any
one." Id. at 609.
26. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
14-15 (1984). Even the Warren Court, which was known for checking government author-
ity on behalf of politically vulnerable groups, was deferential in the context of immigration
law. Id. For example, the Court upheld Congress's power to exclude homosexual aliens in
Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
27. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
28. Id. "Every society possesses the undoubted right to determine who shall compose
its members, and it is exercised by all nations, both in peace and war." Id. at 607 (quoting
then Secretary of State Mr. Marcy under President Pierce).
29. United States ex rel.4Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (citing Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948)).
30. See Schuck, supra note 26, at 16.
31. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
32. Id. at 208.
33. Id.
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out questioning whether the alien had received due process. 34 The Court
stated that "it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly
authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of
the Government.,
35
Although the Mezei decision was rendered during the height of the
Cold War, when the country was preoccupied with the perceived threat of
Communism,36 the decision was still an indication that judicial deference
to Congressional immigration procedures had reached its pinnacle. Op-
position to traditional judicial deference, however, did exist. Justice Jack-
son, dissenting in Mezei, recognized the nation's sovereign right to
exclude aliens, but questioned the procedural methods used to effectuate
the alien's exclusion.37 He asked,
[b]ecause [this alien] has no right of entry, does it follow that he
has no rights at all? Does the power to exclude mean that exclu-
sion may be continued or effectuated by any means which hap-
pen to seem appropriate to the authorities? It would effectuate
his exclusion to eject him bodily into the sea or set him adrift in
a rowboat. Would not such measure be condemned judicially as
a deprivation of life without due process of law? ... It seems to
me that this, occurring within the United States ... may be done
only by proceedings which meet the test of due process of law.
38
Justice Jackson stated that when indefinite detention was the means used
to enforce exclusion, then procedural due process must be required. Jus-
tice Jackson opined that procedural due process for aliens meant that the
alien must be informed of the grounds for his incarceration and then have
a fair opportunity to overcome them.39
The Supreme Court has since altered its deferential attitude toward
Congress's immigration decisions. Although the Court has not ques-
34. Id. at 215. The Court stated "we do not think that respondent's continued exclu-
sion deprives him of any statutory or constitutional rights." Id.
35. Id. at 212 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543
(1950)).
36. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Sur-
rogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1626, 1642 (1992).
37. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 219-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson criticized the
majority for turning its back on a law-abiding citizen of 25 years through its deferential
stance. "This man [Mezei], who seems to have led a life of unrelieved insignificance, must
have been astonished to find himself suddenly putting the Government of the United
States in such fear that it was afraid to tell him why it was afraid of him." Id. at 219.
38. Id. at 226-27.
39. Id. at 227.
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tioned Congress's sovereign right to exclude aliens,40 it has scrutinized
exclusionary procedures to ensure compliance with the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.4' For example, in Landon v.
Plasencia,42 a resident alien was denied entry into the United States for
attempting to transport illegal aliens into the United States.43 However,
because the alien had received only several hours notice of the charges
against her and was not represented by counsel at the hearing,4 4 the
Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether she
had been afforded sufficient due process.45
Plasencia marked the first time that the Court allowed an excludable
alien to assert procedural due process rights.46 Previously, only deport-
40. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Motomura, supra note 36, at 1652-55.
42. 459 U.S. 21 (1982). This case involved the exclusion of a resident alien, Plasencia,
who travelled to Mexico for a few days in order to assist the illegal entry of other aliens.
Id. at 23. Upon her return, Plasencia was subjected to an exclusion hearing, not a deporta-
tion hearing. Id. Plasencia argued that she should have received a deportation hearing
because such hearings were the usual means of proceeding against an alien already physi-
cally in the United States, while exclusion hearings are used as the means of proceeding
against an alien seeking admission from outside the United States. Id. at 25. As a resident
alien, Plasencia qualified as a deportable alien, not an excludable alien, and she claimed
that she was entitled to a deportation hearing where she would benefit from procedural
protections and substantive rights afforded to deportable aliens. Id. at 27. The Court re-
jected Plasencia's argument and held that she was not entitled to a deportation proceeding.
It did, however, find that Plasencia should have been afforded procedural due process in
the exclusionary hearing she received. Id. at 32.
43. Id. at 23.
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1362. Both deportable and excludable aliens are entitled to a hearing
and legal counsel. Id.
45. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 37. Plasencia listed three violations of her procedural due
process rights. She argued, first, that the immigration law judge placed the burden of proof
on her; second, that she was provided inadequate notice of the hearing; and third, that she
waived her right to counsel without a full understanding of the right to counsel or the
consequences of waiver. Id. at 35-36.
46. Id. at 32-34. There has always been a distinction between excludable and deport-
able aliens. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958). An excludable alien is one
considered held at the border, and has never been granted admission to the United States.
Shaughnessy v. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1953). A deportable alien is one who
has gained entry into the United States and is, therefore, guaranteed the protections that
the Constitution grants to all people within the country's borders. Leng May Ma, 357 U.S.
at 187.
No significance, however, is given to whether aliens are within the country legally.
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (citing Yamatay v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S.
86, 100-01 (1903); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950); Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598 (1953)). The irony of this policy is that illegal aliens
who manage to enter without detection are then rewarded with constitutional protections
that those aliens who apply legally for admission, but who are denied entry, are not af-
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able aliens were afforded procedural due process rights.47 Thus, although
Congress continues to maintain plenary power over immigration matters,
judicial deference is no longer absolute. The Court now checks whether
the procedures established by Congress to exclude aliens comport with
the United States Constitution.' This change was one factor that al-
lowed the plaintiffs in Haitian Centers Council to successfully challenge
their indefinite detention at Guantanamo and gain entry to the United
States despite their HIV infection.49
C. Excludable Classes of Aliens
Congress's plenary power encompasses the power to classify groups of
aliens, and to exclude them because of the harm they may pose to the
nation.5 ° In 1891,51 Congress passed a law excluding the following "un-
desirables" from entering the nation: all "idiots," insane persons, paupers
or persons likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a dan-
gerous contagious disease, persons convicted of a felony or misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude, and polygamists.52 The Court upheld the Act
by invoking a self-preservation rationale and stated, "[a] statute exclud-
ing paupers or persons likely to become a public charge is manifestly one
of police and public security."53
Today, the INA54 lists twenty-two grounds to exclude an alien from the
country.55 This list includes the exclusion of aliens afflicted with "a com-
forded. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 977 (1984). This policy may seem unfair, but it
is the law of our land. The Supreme Court has held that "the Bill of Rights is a futile
authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores." United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (quoting Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 598
n.5 (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J. concurring))).
47. Motomura, supra note 36, at 1653.
48. The plenary power doctrine, however, continues to foreclose any assertion of sub-
stantive due process rights for both excludable and deportable aliens. Id. at 1657. There-
fore, procedural due process claims may be the only means through which an alien,
excludable or deportable, may challenge a United States immigration law. Id. at 1656.
49. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
50. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903) (stating that the constitu-
tionality of the legislation in question was not open to discussion because the ability of
Congress to classify aliens and exclude them rested on principles firmly established by the
Court).
51. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084.
52. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 94.
53. Id. at 97.
54. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988).
55. See supra note 2 for a recitation of the twenty-two grounds.
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municable disease of public health significance." 56 Chancroid, gonor-
rhea, granuloma inguinale, infectious leprosy, lymphogranuloma
venereum, infectious syphilis, active tuberculosis, and, as of 1993, HIV,
fall within this category.57
D. The Use of Waivers to Parole Otherwise Ineligible Refugees into the
United States
Although a refugee may be denied entry into the United States for a
health-related reason, the Attorney General has the power to waive a
refugee's exclusion for humanitarian reasons in order to parole him into
the country.58 A "refugee" is a person unwilling or unable to return to
his country of national origin because of a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, or political opinion.5 9 Once an alien has
been classified as a refugee, he may not be returned to the country from
which-he fears persecution.6 °
Refugees are also exempt from two of the twenty-two grounds for ex-
clusion.6 ' In addition, the Attorney General is permitted to waive all but
four of the remaining grounds for exclusion through her parole power,62
including an exclusion based on an alien's HIV infection. 63 The INA per-
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i). The INA defines excludable aliens according to the
following classifications: 1) health-related reasons; 2) criminal and related grounds; 3) na-
tional security and related grounds; 4) public charge; 5) labor non-qualification grounds;
and 6) illegal entrants and immigration violators. Id. § 1182(a)(1)-(6). Exclusion for infec-
tion with HIV falls within the health-related reasons classification.
57. Medical Examinations of Aliens, 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b) (1993).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (Supp. 1993).
59. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
60. Id. § 1253(h)(1).
61. Id. § 1157(c)(3) (Supp. 1993). Refugees are exempt from both the prohibition
against aliens who are likely to become a public charge, id. § 1182(a)(4), and the prohibi-
tion against aliens who seek to perform labor without the permission of the Secretary of
Labor, id. § 1182(a)(5). Furthermore, refugees are not subject to the limitations imposed
by the immigration ceiling. Id. § 1151(b)(1)(B).
62. Id. § 1157(c)(3). "[Tihe Attorney General may waive any other provision of
[§ 11821 (other than paragraph (2)(C) or subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E) of paragraph
(3))." Id. Paragraph (2)(C) refers to the exclusion of aliens who are, or who are suspected
of, drug trafficking. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(C). Subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) refers to
aliens who seek to commit espionage or overthrow the government, subparagraph (B) re-
fers to aliens who have committed, or who are likely to commit, terrorists acts, subpara-
graph (C) refers to the admission of aliens who would have adverse foreign policy effects,
and subparagraph (E) refers to aliens who were associated with the Nazi government. Id.
§ 1182(a)(3)(A), (B), (C) and (E). The Attorney General's ability to waive all grounds for
exclusion except those listed above, applies not only in cases of refugees, but for any ex-
cluded alien. Id. § 1161(e)(2).
63. The statutory provision that excludes aliens who are HIV-infected,
1995] HIV-Infected Aliens
mits waiver of an exclusion "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family
unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest."'  The decision to
grant parole, however, is within the discretion of the Attorney General.65
One of the reasons that the HIV-infected Haitian refugees remained
indefinitely detained in Guantanamo was the Attorney General's refusal
to waive exclusion and grant them parole. The Attorney General, how-
ever, should not have feared granting parole to the HIV-infected Haitians
because paroling an excludable alien does not change the alien's status
for immigration law purposes. 66 Paroled aliens still are considered ex-
cludable, as if they were not within the borders of the United States,67
and therefore may subsequently be returned to U.S. custody or de-
ported.68 In addition, paroled aliens cannot challenge a subsequent con-
finement or deportation because, as excludable aliens, they still have no
right to constitutional protections. 69 Therefore, parole of the HIV-in-
fected Haitian refugees detained at Guantanamo would have been a
more appropriate alternative: than indefinite detention. Parole would
have allowed the government to maintain control over the HIV-infected
Haitian refugees, while allowing the Haitians an opportunity to receive
the medical care they needed and that was not available to them at
§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(i), is excluded from the list of grounds that are deemed unavailable. Id.
§§ 1161(e)(2), 1157(c)(3). Therefore, the Attorney General may waive the exclusion of
aliens or refugees who are barred'from entering the United States because of HIV
infection.
64. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(3), 1161(e)(2).
65. Tartabull v. Thornburgh, 755 F. Supp. 145, 147 (E.D. La. 1990) (noting that the
parole provision "affords the Attorney General a great deal of discretion in deciding
whether to parole or to detain an excludable alien").
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Parole allows an alien to be released into the commu-
nity without changing his immigration status. Id. However, the parole statute includes a
limitation on the grant of parole to refugees. Section 1182(d)(5)(B) provides: "The Attor-
ney General may not parole into the United States an alien who is a refugee unless the
Attorney General determines that compelling reasons in the public interest with respect to
that particular alien require that the alien be paroled into the United States rather than be
admitted as a refugee under section 1157 of. this title." Whether this section would have
prohibited the Attorney General from granting the HIV-infected Haitian refugees parole
is an issue that cannot be answered because the Attorney General did not consider parole
as a way to permit the HIV-infected Haitians entry into the United States.
67. See Tartabull, 755 F. Supp. at 147 (noting "parole of such alien shall not be re-
garded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall ... have
been served the alien shall forewith return or be returned to the custody from which he
was paroled").
68. Id.
69. See supra note 46 for an explanation of why excludable aliens have no right to the
protections afforded by the Constitution.
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Guantanamo.70
II. CHALLENGING THE LAW BANNING HIV-INFECTED IMMIGRANTS
A. Background
In 1993, HIV-infected Haitians were able to circumvent the-HIV-exclu-
sion law by challenging their indefinite detention in a United States facil-
ity. Their detention arose out of the 1981 Alien Migration Interdiction
Operation (AMIO) agreement between the United States and Haiti.71
The AMIO permitted the U.S. Coast Guard to board vessels leaving Ha-
iti in order to inquire about the purpose of the voyage, the conditions of
the vessel, and the status of the passengers.72 When the Coast Guard
believed a Haitian vessel was bound for the United States, it would detain
the vessel and interdict all passengers.73 If upon interdiction the Coast
Guard determined the vessel to be unseaworthy, it would require all Hai-
tians to board the U.S. vessel and would then destroy the Haitian ves-
sel.74 Thus, the. interdicted Haitians were given no choice but to remain
on board the U.S. ship and be taken to wherever the Coast Guard
elected.75
From 1981 to 1991, the Coast Guard interdicted approximately 25,000
Haitians, many of whom were forcibly repatriated to Haiti because they
did not qualify for refugee status in the United States. 77 Immigration into
70. As early as May, 1992, the military doctors at Guantanamo raised concerns about
lack of adequate medical care for HIV-infected Haitians, and especially for those who had
developed AIDS. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (E.D.N.Y.
1993). While counseling and care were available for the HIV-infected detainees, the segre-
gated camp for HIV-positive detainees could have caused a serious medical problem if any
type of infectious disease were to have hit the camp. Id. at 1039; see infra note 99 and
accompanying text (discussing potential consequences of segregating HIV-infected indi-
viduals in confined areas). Additionally, the camp contained neither a CT scanner nor a
variety of specialists (such as ophthalmologists, neurologists, pulmonologists, nephrolo-
gists, and oncologists) that are necessary to diagnose and treat those with AIDS. Id. at
1038.
71. Id. at 1034.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1034-35.
75. Id. at 1035.
76. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2553 (1993).
77. See Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism and Reparations: A Critique of the
United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 705 (1993). Most of these
Haitians could not be granted asylum because they were economic refugees, not political
refugees. Given that Haiti is the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, with 85% of
its residents living below the poverty level, the United States has often found that most
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the United States increased drastically in September, 1991, after Jean
Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first democratically elected president, was
overthrown by a military coup.78 Consequently, interdiction also in-
creased drastically. More than 34,000 Haitians were intercepted within
the six months following the coup,79 an extremely large number com-
pared to the 25,000 who were intercepted in the ten years prior to the
coup.
80
Before the coup, interdiction proceedings had occurred aboard the
Coast Guard's vessels.81 Due to the large numbers of Haitians seeking
asylum after the coup, however, the Coast Guard moved the proceedings
to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 2 In addition, because so many Haitians
were seeking asylum, the United States sought the assistance of other
countries to accept some of the Haitian'refugees. 3 Only Belize and Hon-
duras agreed to help, but on the condition that each Haitian seeking asy-
lum submit to an HIV test.' The results of the HIV tests indicated the
presence of HIV in a number of the Haitians detained at Guantanamo. 85
Based upon this discovery, the United States similarly elected to test for
HIV all Haitians who qualified for asylum.'
Because of the prevalence of HIV, the government established a sepa-
rate camp at Guantanamo for those Haitians who tested HIV-positive.
The camp, however, was more than just a place to reside, it was reminis-
cent of a prison because the HIV-infected Haitians were not free to leave
and were forced to remain there indefinitely. 7 Furthermore, the camp's
medical facilities were inadequate to treat the HIV-infected patients.8 8
Despite the inadequate facilities, the refugees were forced to remain.
They could not return to Haiti for fear of political persecution, and they
Haitians fleeing the country are fleeing the economic hardship and not political persecu-
tion. Id.
78. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 823 F. Supp. at 1034.
79. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2554.
80. Id. at 2553.
81. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 823 F. Supp. at 1034.





87. Id. at 1037 (describing conditions of camp as including barbed wire surrounding
the camp, plastic garbage bags tied to the sides of the building in order to keep out the
rain, virtual imprisonment within the camp with military guards surrounding the perimeter
of the area, and the occurrence of pre-dawn military sweeps).
88. See infra note 99.
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could not enter the United States for asylum proceedings because of the
law banning their entry.
B. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale
89
Haitians Centers Council was a class action brought by the plaintiffs9°
on behalf of the HIV-infected Haitian refugees seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from Government 91 action against the HIV-infected Hai-
tians detained in Guantanamo.92 The plaintiffs claimed that the Govern-
ment's refusal to allow the HIV-infected Haitians to meet with Haitian
Services Organizations that were attempting to provide advocacy and
counseling violated the Haitian's First and Fifth Amendment rights to ob-
tain and communicate with counsel.93 Second, the plaintiffs claimed that
the Government had violated the HIV-infected Haitians' constitutional
due process right to adequate medical care and to be free from indefinite
detention. The remainder of the claims involved allegations that the At-
torney General had abused her discretion by relying on the HIV-exclu-
sion law to justify withholding a grant of parole to the HIV-infected
Haitians.94
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on almost all of their claims. Although the
court did not consider the question of whether the HIV-infected Haitian
detainees at Guantanamo had a First Amendment right,95 the court held
89. 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
90. Id. at 1032. The plaintiffs included Haitian Centers Council, Inc., National Coali-
tion for Haitian Refugees, Inc., Immigration Law Clinic of the Jerome N. Frank Legal
Organization of New Haven (collectively referred to as Haitian Services Organizations),
four HIV-infected Haitian detainees in Guantanamo, and two immediate relatives of the
detained HIV-infected Haitians. Id.
91. The Government defendants were the Acting Commissioner of the INS, Chris
Sale, the Attorney General, Janet Reno, the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, the
Commander of the United States Coast Guard, Rear Admiral Robert Kramek, and the
Commander of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, Admiral Kime (collectively the
"Government"). Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The plaintiffs also claimed that this same action violated the First Amendment
Rights of the Haitian Services Organizations by denying them access to their clients. Id. at
1034.
94. Id. The claims included: 1) the failure of the Government to follow rulemaking
procedures; 2) arbitrary and capricious action not in accordance with the law; 3) judicial
enforceability of the duty of non-refoulment; and 4) equal protection.
95. Id. at 1041. Addressing the associated claim of whether the Haitian Services Orga-
nizations' First Amendment rights had been violated in being denied access to the HIV-
infected Haitian detainees, the court ruled that a First Amendment violation had occurred.
Id. at 1040. The court noted that the First Amendment was applicable on the U.S. Naval
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that they had a Fifth Amendment right to counsel and a liberty interest in
not being wrongfully repatriated to Haiti.96 The court additionally held.
that the erroneous deprivation of counsel at asylum hearings denied the
Haitians of their right to a fair adjudication in violation of their liberty
interest in not being returned to Haiti.97
Next, the court addressed each of the plaintiffs' remaining due process
claims. First, the court stated that as individuals in official custody, the
HIV-infected Haitians had a constitutionally protected due process right
to adequate medical care and "safe conditions" owed to all persons in
official custody.98 The medical facilities at Guantanamo Bay were inade-
quate to provide medical care for those Haitians who had developed
AIDS.99 Further, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) re-
Base in Guantanamo because the facility was under complete control of the United States
Government. Id. Furthermore, the court's decision rested upon Supreme Court precedent
holding that the right of legal and political advocacy organizations to associate with and
advise persons regarding their legal rights are modes of political expression protected by
the First Amendment. Id. (citing In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963)). The Government had permitted press, clergy, politicians, and non-law-
yers to meet with the Haitian detainees, but had denied access to the Haitian Services
Organizations. Id. The court, therefore, concluded that "the Haitian Service Organiza-
tions ha[d] been barred because of the viewpoint of the message they [sought] to convey to
the Haitians, in violation of the First Amendment," and held that "[s]uch Government
discrimination against disfavored viewpoints [struck] at the heart of the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 1041.
96. Id. at 1042. The court noted that the Haitians had been detained for almost two
years, and stated, "as the Haitians' ties to the United States have grown, so have their due
process rights." Id. (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1950)).
97. Id. at 1043.
98. Id. (citing Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463' U.S. 239, 244 (1983);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982)). The court stated that the United States
Supreme Court has long held that constitutional rights apply to all noncitizens who en-
counter official U.S. action. Id. at 1041 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987)). Clearly, the interdiction of the Haitians at sea and forced deten-
tion at Guantanamo is official action by the United States Government. Id. at 1041-42. In
support of this claim the court stated that, "[i]f the Due Process Clause does not apply to
the detainees at Guantanamo, [the government] would have discretion deliberately to
starve or beat them, to deprive them of medical attention, . . . or to discriminate among
them based on the color of their skin." Id. at 1042.
99. Id. at 1038. The court specifically opposed segregating the HIV-infected Haitians
in an HIV "prison camp," and stated that because HIV-positive individuals are immuno-
suppressed and are therefore more susceptible to infections, the forced segregation placed
the detainees at a greater risk of contracting life threatening diseases than if they were
permitted to live in the general population. Id. at 1039. The court determined that the
prison camp environment seriously impaired an effective doctor-patient relationship be-
cause the detainees did not trust the military doctors as they believed the doctors were
involved in their continued detention in Guantanamo. Id.
The court also focused on the camp's inability to provide adequate medical care to the
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peatedly had ignored suggestions by the U.S. military doctors at Guanta-
namo that the HIV-infected Haitians be evacuated to the United
States.' °° The court held that the INS's repeated failure to act on these
recommendations constituted deliberate indifference to the Haitians'
medical needs in violation of their due process rights. 101
Second, the court found that as individuals held in custody by the
United States, the HIV-infected Haitians had a liberty interest in not be-
ing arbitrarily or indefinitely detained. 02 Acknowledging that the Hai-
tians were neither criminals nor national security risks, the court held
that:
[t]he Government has failed to demonstrate to this Court's satis-
faction that the detainees' illness warrants the kind of indefinite
detention usually reserved for spies and murderers. Where de-
tention no longer serves a legitimate purpose, the detainees
must be released. The camp at Guantanamo is the only known
refugee camp in the world composed entirely of HIV+ refugees.
The Haitians' plight is a tragedy of immense proportion and
their continued detention is totally unacceptable to this
Court. 103
Addressing the plaintiffs' final claim, the court held that the Attorney
General's refusal to parole the Haitians from detention because of their
HIV status was an abuse of discretion."°4 The court cited three specific
ways in which the Attorney General had abused her discretion. 0 5 First,
HIV-infected Haitians when their HIV developed into AIDS. The government itself ac-
knowledged that the medical facilities at Guantanamo were inadequate to provide medical
care to those Haitians who had developed AIDS. Id. at 1038. For example, the clinic in
Guantanamo lacked advanced medical equipment and medical specialists necessary to di-
agnose and treat AIDS patients. Id. More important, the court seemed particularly dis-
turbed by the negative attitude displayed by the INS toward the treatment of the HIV-
,infected Haitians. The court referred to a remark made by Duane Austin, the INS Special
Assistant to the Director of Congressional and Public Affairs, to the press in response to
the press's inquiry as to why the INS was not going to send Haitians with AIDS to the
United States for treatment. Austin responded, "they're going to die anyway, aren't
they?" Id. The court responded, "[i]t is outrageous, callous and reprehensible that defend-
ant INS finds no value in providing adequate medical care even when a patient's illness is
fatal." Id.
100. Id. at 1038.
101. Id. at 1044.
102. Id. at 1045 (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); McNeil v.
Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 250 (1972); Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204,
209 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 339 (2d Cir. 1986)).
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 1047.
105. Id. at 1048.
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she had exercised her discretion in order to discriminate invidiously."
This discrimination was apparent from the fact that the Government had
not previously enforced its communicable disease exclusion laws strictly
against aliens, and chose only to do so for the first time with regard to the
Haitians. °7 Second, the Attorney General had deviated from established
parole policy by ignoring the regulations that authorized her to parole
aliens with serious medical conditions. 10 8 Parole was considered appro-
priate when "emergent reasons" existed such that "continued detention
would not be appropriate.' 0 9 A prime example of this was the detention
of HIV-positive Haitians "in virtual prison camps for over eighteen
months,""' and the withholding of proper medical care. Third, the court
held that the Attorney General had given effect to considerations that
Congress could not have intended to make relevant."' In relying on the
HIV-exclusion law as the reason to deny the plaintiffs parole, the Attor-
ney General misinterpreted the statute. Although the HIV-exclusion law
makes HIV-infected aliens excludable, their exclusion is not statutorily
mandated. Therefore, the law did not prohibit the Attorney General
from paroling HIV-infected excludable aliens. 1 2 Furthermore, based on
evidence that the admission of the detained Haitians would increase the
incidence of AIDS in the United States' population by only a fraction of
one percent, the court reasoned that there was no need to deny their
parole." 13 The court ordered that the detained Haitians be immediately
released to anywhere but Haiti so that they could receive proper medical
treatment.' 1 4 As of July, 1993, all of the HIV-infected Haitian refugees
were admitted to the United States for medical treatment."
5
106. Id.
107. Id. The court stated that the "Haitians remain[ed] in detention solely because they
[were] Haitian and ha[d] tested HIV-positive." Id.
108. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(1)). Furthermore, the court found that there were
no regulations or guidelines providing that parole must be denied because of an alien's
HIV infection. Id.
109. Id. (citing the general parole regulations contained in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(1)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1049.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1049 n.9.
114. Id. at 1050.
115. In March, 1993, before the court's decision in Haitian Centers Council, the court
ordered 50 Haitians who had developed AIDS sent to the United States for proper medical
treatment. Haitians Escape Guantanamo Not HIV Shadow, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1993, at
A2. In April, 15 Haitians who were in the advanced stages of AIDS were also admitted to
the United States for medical treatment. Twenty Haitians Arrive in Miami, LEGAL INTEL-
LIGENCER, Apr. 6, 1993, at 5. In the beginning of June, 16 Haitians were evacuated for
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C. The Indefinite Detention of Excludable Aliens
The United States Supreme Court has never decided the issue of
whether indefinite detention of excludable aliens is constitutional. In ad-
dition, courts that have considered the issue are split in their holdings." 6
The INA provides for the detention of an alien while determining
whether the alien is excludable and subject to deportation.' 17 Once an
alien is determined to be excludable, the Act provides for his immediate
deportation," 8 unless immediate deportation is not practicable or
proper." 9 For example, an alien is not immediately deportable if neither
the alien's country of origin, nor any other country will accept him.
Some courts interpret the INA as implicitly allowing indefinite deten-
tion of aliens because the statute does not expressly state the length of
time that a stay of deportation may continue. 120 These courts have held
that because no country will accept the aliens, they cannot be deported,
and the only way to release them would be to parole them into the
United States.12' These courts, therefore, claim that to force the Attor-
ney General to parole aliens would violate her discretionary power over
parole decisions.12 2
Other courts, to the contrary, have distinguished between an alien's
interest in admission and his interest in being free from arbitrary and
prolonged detention.' 23 In Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison,12 4 the United
humanitarian reasons. Church Group to Resettle Guantanamo Haitians, LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, June 11, 1993, at 5. Finally, on June 8th, the case was decided and all HIV-in-
fected Haitians remaining at Guantanamo Bay were ordered immediately released. On
June 21st, the remaining Haitian detainees were released into the United States. Closed-
Door Policy for Refugees, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1993, at S36.
116. See Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 103 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that "indefinite
detention of a permanently excludable alien ... is not unlawful"); cf Barrera-Echavarria v.
Rison, 21 F.3d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that indefinite incarceration of excludable
alien for eight years because he could not be returned to Cuba, was a violation of the
alien's Fifth Amendment rights); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1389-
90 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that Attorney General lacks power to detain excludable aliens
beyond a reasonable period of time).
117. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1988).
118. Id. § 1227(a)(1).
119. Id. § 1227(a)(1), (d).
120. Mark D. Kemple, Note, Legal Fictions Mask Human Suffering: The Detention of
the Mariel Cubans Constitutional, Statutory, International Law, and Human Considerations,
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1733, 1784 (1989).
121. Tartabull v. Thornburgh, 755 F. Supp. 145, 147 (E.D. La. 1990).
122. Id.
123. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981).
124. 21 F.3d 314 (9th Cir. 1994).
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States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld. the release, to a
halfway house or some form of supervised release program, of an exclud-
able Cuban alien, who had been imprisoned in U.S. prisons for eight
years because there was no place for him to go.125 In reaching its deci-
sion, the court noted that:
Barrera is . an excluded alien, who in a legal sense has not
entered this country. [However], it is not disputed that he is a
person. He is a person within our jurisdiction. As a person he is
protected by the Fifth Amendment. 126 The [incarceration] has
gone on for over eight years. It can no longer be fictionally
characterized as exclusion from the country. It is imprisonment
within the country. 27
Thus, the court recognized that an alien's "alien" status should not permit
the government to deprive him of due process through indefinite deten-
tion in a U.S. facility.
III. ANALYZING THE HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL DECISION
A. The Effect of the Decision on Other HIV-infected Aliens Seeking to
Immigrate
The HIV-infected Haitians found themselves indefinitely detained in
Guantanamo because they were HIV-positive refugees. Had they simply
been HIV-positive aliens, rather than refugees, they would have been re-
turned to their country of origin when their applications for admission
were denied due to their HIV infection. In the future, any other HIV-
infected alien seeking to immigrate will most likely not be able to circum-
vent the law barring their admission because of the validity of the HIV-
exclusion law.
The decision in Haitian Centers Council was based on a number of fac-
tors present in the case of the HIV-infected Haitians at Guantanamo: 1)
their refugee status; 2) their inability to have counsel present at asylum
hearings; 3) their indefinite detention; 4) the lack of adequate medical
facilities; and, 5) the Attorney General's abuse of discretion in denying
parole. Most important, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York is a court that adopts the belief that aliens have
substantive due process rights.
In order for HIV-infected refugees to gain entry into the United States
125. Id. at 315.
126. Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
127. Id. at 317.
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in the future, two factors would have to be present. First, the refugees
would have to be denied due process of a liberty interest. Substantive
due process violations would include indefinite detention, the denial of
adequate medical care, or the denial of parole because of the refugee's
HIV-infection. Second, the determining factor would be in choosing the
right jurisdiction. An excludable alien's substantive due process chal-
lenge would fail miserably in a court unwilling to recognize that excluda-
ble aliens have substantive due process rights.
B. A Recent Supreme Court Decision on Immigration Law Affirms the
Continued Predominance of the Plenary Power Doctrine and
Judicial Deference Toward Congress
The Supreme Court has never afforded substantive due process rights
to excludable aliens. 128 In the Court's most recent ruling on an immigra-
tion issue, the Court held that excludable aliens' were not entitled to sub-
stantive due process rights.129 In light of this decision, it is likely that, had
Haitian Centers Council reached the Supreme Court, the Court would
have reversed the District Court's holding that the HIV-infected Haitian
refugees at Guantanamo were being denied due process of a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest.
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided the case of Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc.,' 31 indicating its most recent word on the immigration laws
of this country.' 31 In Sale, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality
of an Executive Order132 that permitted the interdiction and forced repa-
triation of Haitians at sea.133 The plaintiffs claimed that the order vio-
lated § 243(h)(1) of the INA,13 1 which prohibits the Attorney General
from returning an alien to a country where the alien shows that his life or
freedom would be threatened.' 5 The Court, however, found that this
law had no extraterritorial application, and therefore did not apply to
128. In fact, excludable aliens were only afforded procedural due process rights for the
first time in 1982. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying textual discussion of the hold-
ing in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
129. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (holding that Executive
Order permitting forced repatriation of refugees on the high seas did not violate the INA).
130. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
131. Id.
132. Exec. Order No. 12807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
133. Id. The plaintiffs in this case were the Haitian Centers Council and a number of
individual Haitians that had been interdicted at sea. Id.
134. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
135. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2552.
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actions taken by the Coast Guard on the high seas. 3 6 In the spirit of
traditional immigration law, the Court distinguished between aliens who
were within our borders and those who were not, and stated that some
rights are not extended to those aliens who are not yet within the
country.
137
The Court concluded that "[t]his case presents a painfully common sit-
uation in which desperate people, convinced that they can no longer .re-
main in their homeland, take desperate measures to escape. Although
the human crisis is compelling, there is no solution to be found in a judi-
cial remedy. ' 138 From the Court's conclusion, it is apparent that adher-
ence to traditional concepts of immigration law will continue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since 1875, Congress has had plenary power to regulate immigration
and the Court has continuously deferred to that power, even in 1993. Be-
cause the Court has only entertained questions regarding the procedural
methods that Congress uses to regulate immigration, there are few chal-
lenges that HIV-infected aliens can bring in order to gain entry into the
United States.
While HIV-infected aliens may seek parole from the Attorney Gen-
eral, that decision remains in her discretion. The only remaining way for
an HIV-infected alien to enter the country is if the factors present in Hai-
tian Centers Council fall into place: refugee status, significant substantive
due process violations, and a favorable jurisdiction. Moreover, were a
decision recognizing the substantive due process rights of excludable
aliens appealed to the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the Court would
uphold a grant of substantive due process rights to excludable aliens.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that all of these determinate factors will mani-
fest themselves again.
The Haitian Centers Council decision is a legally sound decision. The
decision recognized that although the HIV-exclusion law is valid, its erro-
neous application should not be permitted. The government's reliance on
the HIV-exclusion law was inappropriate in the case of the HIV-infected
136. Id. at 2563.
137. Id. at 2561 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212
(1953); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)).
138. Id. at 2567 (quoting Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 841 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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Haitian refugees at Guantanamo because it served as the legal justifica-
tion for the indefinite detention of innocent people.
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